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NOTES AND COMMENT
evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of permission.
Defendant and his wife testified that the car-was being used without their permission and therefore it was unlawfully in operation.
This testimony was not contradicted. The chauffeur corroborated
this testimony. Surrounding this evidence were circumstances which
tended to bolster up defendant's statement, i.e., the car was being
used after hours and also contained a party of the chauffeur's
friends. The trial Judge submitted the testimony to the jury to
decide upon its credibility, and they found for plaintiff.
On appeal the respondent maintained that this evidence was interested and discredited. But the Court of Appeals held that even
though interested the fact still remained that it was not discredited.
The only conclusion, said the Court, that could be reasonably drawn
from the uncontradicted evidence was that the chauffeur at the time
of the accident operated the car unlawfully and without permission.
The judgment was accordingly reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Summing up, the rule may be stated that a presumption is
overcome by substantial and credible evidence. 34 And when a party
does not come forward to discredit such evidence it is apparent that
there is no question for the jury.
JOHN BENNETT.

EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT IN FORM OF ASSIGNMENT.

By the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1897,1

New York aligned itself with its sister states in the interests of
commerce and for the purpose of bringing into the law of commercial
paper a uniformity which heretofore had been lacking. In the main,
the statute codified the common law, although some of the old rules
were changed. It might be supposed that with a common basis for
adjudication, the courts of the several states would find it easy to
agree on basic principles. But often a question of construction of the
same section of the statute will arise in two separate states and be
answered differently.

It is possible, therefore, for states with the

same Negotiable Instruments Law to adopt different constructions of
the statute.
"In criminal cases the rule is different. Presumption of sanity and evidence are all to be considered by the jury. Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159

(1878); People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903). "This presumption [of innocence] on the one hand, supplemented by any other evidence he
may adduce, and the evidence against him on the other, constitute the elements
from which the legal conclusion of his guilt or innocence can be drawn." It
must be charged to the jury. Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1894).
'N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612; Cons. Laws 1909, c. 38.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
A striking example of this divergence of authority was brought
out in the case of Fay v. Witte. 2 Defendant had delivered to plaintiff, before maturity and for a good and valuable consideration, a
negotiable promissory note which was indorsed in the following
manner:
"I hereby assign all my right and interest in this note to
Richard Fay in full.
Harry C. Witte."
The note was protested for non-payment and due notice given aef endant. Fay brought this action on the note against Witte as an unqualified or general indorser. 3 Defendant contended that his indorsement
was a qualified one and as such did not make him liable on non,
payment and notice of protest.
The Appellate Division favored the defendant and, by a three
to two count, dismissed the complaint. 4 They predicated their judgment on the maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 5 In
other words, since an indorsement implies both a transfer of the note
and a promise to pay if the maker fails to do so, by assigning the note,
Witte expressly transferred the title and thereby excluded the second
implication-the promise to pay on default. This decision was in
accordance with one line of authority.
In a brief opinion, the reasons for which the two judges dissented are ably set forth by Hill, J. The dissenting opinion represents the other widely divergent line of authority which interprets, in
the light of the statute, words of assignment written on the back of a
note, as in Fay v. Witte, to constitute an unqualified indorsement.
To quote:
"Uniform treatment of negotiable instruments is desirable
among the states, and courts have suggested that if authority as to any question does not exist at home, especial regard
should be given the decisions of other jurisdictions" The
reported decisions in New York do not furnish a precedent as
to the issues here presented. In the states where the question
-2262 N. Y. 215, 186 N. E. 678 (1933).

'N. Y.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1897) §116, which states, in part:
"He [general indorser] engages that on due presentment it [the
instrument] shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be,
according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary
proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to
the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
'Fay v. Witte, 236 App. Div. 567, 260 N. Y. Supp. 683 (3rd Dept. 1932).
'The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
' Century Bank v. Breithart, 89 Misc. 308, 151 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1915).
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has been passed upon, the decisions are in conflict." 7 (Italics
writer's.)
He then goes on to state substantially, as in the majority opinion,
the reasons why some states hold that indorsements similar to the
one in quesion are qualified. But in terse language he states that "the
plain language of the statute leaves no room for this reasoning. The
enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law was designed to simplify, clarify and make definite so much of the law merchant as
governs the exchange, among business men, of documents which are
treated as money. The statute says, 'A qualified endorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It
may be made by adding to the indorser's signature the words "without
recourse" or any words of similar import.' 8 This indorsement does
not comply with the requirements of the statute. * * * The indorsement is unqualified."
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's judgment. To them the line of reasoning adopted by Judge Hill seemed
to express the law as they saw it. The theory of the authorities
endorsed by the Court is based on another maxim, "Expressio eorum
quae tacitae, insunt nihil operatur." 9 According to the maxim, it
avails nothing to the indorser to use words in his indorsement
expressly assigning the note, because the transfer of the note is tacitly
understood in an indorsement, just as the indorser's liability is
implied, without words expressly creating it. The Court said: 10
"We find no words in the indorsement which state expressly that the payee or indorser assigns or transfers the note,
but is not to be held over in case of default. We have a clear
expression of an assignment and transfer. This is what the
word used means. The note and title to the note were passed
to Richard Fay, the plaintiff. However, we find nothing else.
The words 'without recourse' are not used, nor any words of
similar import. We may imply by the use of the word 'assign,'
as did the Appellate Division, that the payee considered himself no longer liable, but implication is not permitted by the
statute. The denial of recourse to a prior indorser must be
found in the express words, 'without recourse,' or words of
similar import. This indorsement contains no such words.
Witte, the defendant, became an unqualified indorser, liable
as such upon non-payment and notice of protest."
' Supa note 4, at 568.

'Supra note 3, §68. A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a

mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the
indorser's signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar
import. Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable character of the
instrument.
of those things which are tacitly understood avails nothing.
'The expression
10
Supra note 2, at 218, 186 N. E. at 679.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Court, though it mentioned in passing the fact that the
words in question, if used on a separate piece of paper not attached
to the note, would constitute a mere assignment, followed the rule
that the writing of such words on the back of the instrument itself
constitutes an indorsement." In fact, all the cases cited in this article
in support of either construction of the words of assignment-that
they constitute a qualified or an unqualified indorsement-are a fortiori authority for the proposition that such an "assignment" is
effective as an indorsement so as to keep alive the negotiability of the
instrument. There is some authority to the effect that an assignment
on the back of a promissory note destroys its negotiability. 12 But
even in the states where the decisions of the courts have so held, there
will be found decisions to the contrary. 13 The rule can be taken to be
Burdick, supra note 11; Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184, 66 N. W. 493 (1895).

well settled that such words as "I hereby assign, transfer," etc.,
written on the back of a note, will be deemed an indorsement and
the negotiability of the instrument will remain unimpaired.
But in Pay v. Witte, the Court found no rule as clearly defined
and well settled as this to fall back on when it had to answer the
question, "Are the words in the indorsement to be construed as
it a qualified or an unqualified indorsement?" As
intending to make
14
one Court said,
"Indorsements of similar wording and the legal effect of
them have been before the courts in a number of cases both
before and after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. The cases are in irreconcilable conflict."
One author says, 15

"The words most frequently involved are 'all my right,
title and interest,' or like words, as where the indorsement is
'I hereby assign all my right, title,' etc. As to the effect of
using such words, the decisions are in conflict."
"Supra note 3, §36, subd. 6 (Where a signature is so placed upon the
instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same
intended to sign, he is deemed to be an indorser.) ; §113 (A person placing his
signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor is
deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his
intention to be bound in some other capacity.) ; Farnsworth v. Burdick, 94 Kan.
749, 147 Pac. 863 (1915), where the words on the back of the note were: "I
here by assine this note over to," etc., the Court said: "The weight of authority
was [before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law], and is, that this
is a commercial indorsement." See also Howard v. Kincaid, 54 Okla. 271,
156 Pac. 628 (1915) and cases cited therein.
; Nelson v. Southworth,
1 Hatch v. Barrett, 34 Kan. 223, 8 Pac. 129 (1885)
93 Kan. 532, 144 Pac. 835 (1914)- Aniba v. Yoemans, 39 Mich. 171 (1878);
Gale v. Mayhew, 161 Mich. 96, 125 N. W. 781 (1910).
"3Walker v. Sims, 9 Kan. App. 890, 64 Pac. 81 (1899); Farnsworth v.
Prichard v. Strike, 66 Utah 394, 243 Pac. 114 (1926).
'8 C. J. 371.
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Consequently, the court found itself forced to join one of the
two groups, either that which was grouped under the maxim, "Expressio unius, etc." and considered such words of assignment written
on the back of a note to be a qualified indorsement, or that grouped
under the maxim, "Expressio eorurn, etc." and which considered
such words to be an unqualified indorsement. The views of the first
group are clearly expressed in Spencer v. Halpern.16 There the note
was indorsed, "For value received, I hereby transfer my interest in
the within note, etc." The Court held that by expressly stating that
the indorsement was a "transfer of interest," the indorser excluded
the other implication of law following an indorsement in blank, or in
full, namely, indorser's liability on non-payment. It adopted the
first maxim and rejected the other. Many other cases in different
jurisdictions hold, similarly, that such words constitute a qualified
indorsement. 17 Certainly, the argument of this line of authorities is
very well considered. Where an indorsement implies two things, why
should not the express writing of one of these implications exclude
the other?
"062 Ark. 595, 37 S. W. 711 (1896).
' Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536 (1858), in which it is held that an
indorsement in these words: "For value received the 20th day of February,
1850, I transfer unto John B. Hailey all my right and title to the within note,
to be enjoyed in the same manner as may have been enjoyed by me," exempts

the indorser from personal liability on the note.
Hammond Lumber Co. v. Kearsley, 36 Cal. App. 431, 172 Pac. 404 (1918),

where an indorsement in these words: "For value received we hereby assign

all of our interest in this promissory note, etc.," was held to be a qualified
indorsement, under a statute similar to that in New York.
Ellsworth v. Varney, 83 II. App. 94 (1898), where an indorsement, "For

value received I hereby convey all right, title and interest in the within note to
E.," was held to express no further intention than to pass title and interest
which the "assignor" had in the note and, consequently, was a qualified
indorsement.
Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 54 S. E. 847 (1906). In this case the
action was on a note indorsed as follows: "For value received, I herewith
transfer and assign all my right, title and interest in and to the within note,
etc." Under a statute similar to that of New York, the Court held this writing
to be a qualified indorsement, constituting the indorser a mere assignor of title,
though not impairing the negotiability of the instrument. The Court said:
"A qualified indorsement may, by the express terms of that section
[one equivalent to §68 of the N. Y. Negotiable Instruments Law], be
made by adding to the indorser's signature the words 'without recourse,'
or any 'words of similar import.' It has been settled in commercial law
that a transfer by indorsement of the 'right and title' of the payee or an
indorser to a negotiable note is equivalent to an indorsement 'without
recourse' and words such as were used in this case are therefore in their
meaning or 'import' similar to such an indorsement and this is their
reasonable interpretation."
Marion Nat. Bank v. Harden, 83 W. Va. 119, 97 S. E. 600 (1918), where
these words, "we hereby assign, transfer and set over, etc.," were held to be a
qualified indorsement.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Sound as this argument may appear, the divergent line of authorities just as ably supports its stand. The argument set forth by this
group is soundly propounded in the case of Maine Trust and Banking Co. v. Butler: 18

"It would seem obvious that, when writing out upon the
back of the paper just what would have been inferred from
his signature, the indorser has incurred no greater liabilityhas done no more than he would-had he simply placed his
signature there. How can it be said, then, that he has done
less, in the absence of that clear declaration of his intent to
exempt himself, mentioned in all the authorities as necessary
in the case of a qualified indorsement?" 19

This is their argument, based on the maxim, "Expressio eorum, etc."
The cases in favor of this proposition are more numerous than those
favoring the other. 20 Many of them 21 quote Mr. Daniel as stating the
rule best. He says : 22
"The question is: Does the writing over a signature of an
express assignment which the law imports from the signature
per se exclude and negative the idea of conditional liability
which the law also imports if such assignment were not expressed in full? We think not. It is from the fact that a
payee assigns a bill or negotiable note by indorsement of his
name on the back of it, that the law implies his liability as an
indorser. His relation to the instrument creates the implication, and the circumstance that he sets forth that relation in
express terms does not change it, for the maxim applies,
'Expressio eorum quae tacitae insunt nihil operatur.' 23 Did
1845 Minn. 506, 48 N. W. 333 (1891).
The note here was indorsed, "For
value received, I hereby assign and transfer the within note, etc."
" Compare with quotation from Fay v. Witte, supra note 10.
' Fay v. Witte, supra note 2; Sears v. Lantz and Bates, 47 Iowa 658
(1871) ; Jones County Trust and Savings Bank v. Kurt, 192 Iowa 965, 182 N.
W. 409 (1921); Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me. 19, 22 Am. Rep. 547 (1877);
Markey v. Corey, supra note 13; Maine Trust & Banking Co. v. Butler,
supra note 18; Davidson v. Powell, 114 N. C. 575, 19 S. E. 601 (1894);
Copeland v. Burke, 59 Okla. 219, 158 Pac. 1162 (1916); Behrens v. Kirkgard
(Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S. W. 698 (1912) ; Prichard v. Strike, .npra note 14;
Citizen's Nat. Bank v. Walton, 96 Va. 435, 31 S. E. 890 (1898). In Behrens v.
Kirkgard, where the several indorsements read, "For value received I hereby
sell, transfer and assign, etc.," the Court said, "The indorsements herein do not,
in our opinion, contain any restrictive language which limits the liability of the
indorsers to a mere warranty of the title to the notes, and exonerate them from
personal liability for the payment thereof."
' Fay v. Witte, supra note 2; Markey v. Corey; Davidson v. Powell;
Copeland v. Burke, all supra note 20; Prichard v. Strike, supra note 14.
1 1 DANIEL, NEG. INST. (6th ed.) §688c. Cited in Maine Trust & Banking
Co. v. Butler, supra note 18; Behrens v. Kirkgard, supra note 20.
' Supra note 9.
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the payee intend merely to pass title he should use the words
'without recourse' or some phrase of equal import. His liability is implied without words expressly creating it. To be negatived, words should be used which negate the implication."
And this must be taken to be the meaning of our Negotiable Instruments Law.2 4 A qualified indorsement will not be implied.
The writer believes that the Court in Fay v. Witte, faced with
the duty of choosing one of the two constructions, chose the better
rule, for three reasons. Since this choice was in accordance with the
numerical weight of authority, it will make for conformity, as far as
possible. In the light of the statute, this rule is the better construction of the words of assignment. Lastly, and this is most important,
it is the more practical construction from the standpoint of the needs
of commerce. The Court in Copeland v. Burke 25 adopted the majority rule, indeed felt constrained to do so, because it was "supported
by the better reasoning and more in consonance with the commercial
needs of the day. In these modern times commercial paper has come
to play a very large part in the business life of the country. * * * The
effect of and the liability incurred by an indorsement is a matter of
common knowledge. The phrase 'without recourse' as employed in
such business is in everyday use. * * * If the defendant did not intend
to be bound by his indorsement on the note in question, he should
have used some words that would clearly indicate he was not an
ordinary indorser."
Commercial paper has become of the utmost importance. Its
negotiability must be unimpaired as far as possible if the business of
the world is to go on unhampered. The Negotiable Instruments Law
recognizes this and so does the Court in Fay v. Witte and so hold the
other cases under the majority rule. To them a writing on the back
of a note is an indorsement, and an unqualified one, at that. This is
the best of the several types of indorsements, carrying with it the
greatest advantages to the subsequent holder. In the interests of
commerce, any ambiguous writing on the back of a note must be
construed as being an unqualified indorsement. Only by clearly
expressing his intention by the use of the phrase "without recourse"
or "words of similar import" can the indorser hope to escape his
conditional liability.
ANTHONY CURRER.
2' N. Y. NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTs LAW (1897) §36, subds. 6, 68, 113,
supra notes 8 and 11.
'Supra note 20. The note was indorsed, "I transfer my right, title and
interest in same, etc."

